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Pilewski: People v. Holmes

PEOPLE v. HOLMES: AND SOMETIMES
IT'S NOT A SEIZURE
INTRODUCTION

In June, 1993, the New York Court of Appeals decided the
case of People v. Holmes. 1 The facts of the case are as follows:
On the afternoon of December 23, 1989, two uniformed police
officers, Frederick Nelthrope and John Moynihan, while
patrolling the Upper West Side of Manhattan, observed a group
congregating in a "known narcotics location."2 Noticing a bulge
in the pocket of one of the men, the marked patrol car proceeded
toward the group. 3 Although Officer Moynihan directed Holmes
to approach the police vehicle, he began to walk away. 4 As
Officer Moynihan alighted from the police car, Holmes fled,
prompting immediate chase by both officers. 5 While in hot
pursuit, the officers observed Holmes throw a plastic bag through
a chain link fence and into a courtyard. 6 The officers eventually
caught and arrested Holmes, recovering the plastic bag, which
7
was later found to contain crack cocaine.
After the hearing court denied Holmes' motion to suppress the
drugs, he pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fifth degree. 8 On appeal, the First Department
1. 81 N.Y.2d 1056, 619 N.E.2d 396, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1993).
2. Id. at 1057, 619 N.E.2d at 397, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 460.

3. Id. This man was later identified as David Holmes, the defendant in
this case. Id.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

8. Id.; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.06 (McKinney 1992). Section
220.06 states that
[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses:
1. a controlled substance with intent to sell it; or
2. one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of
an aggregate weight of one-half ounce or more containing a
narcotic preparation; or

727
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unanimously reversed the lower court's ruling, granted the
motion to suppress, vacated the defendant's guilty plea, and
dismissed the indictment. 9
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that:
While the police may have had an objective credible reason to
approach defendant to request information -- having observed
him in a "known narcotics location" with an unidentified bulge
in the pocket of his jacket -- those circumstances, taken together
with defendant's flight, could not justify the significantly greater
intrusion of police pursuit. 10
The court of appeals reasoned that "[i]f these circumstances could
combine with flight to justify pursuit, then in essence the right to
inquire would be tantamount to the right to seize, and there
would, in fact, be no right 'to be let alone.' That is not, nor
should it be, the law." 1 1 Consequently, the vacatur of the guilty
plea, the granting of defendant's motion to suppress, and the
12
dismissal of the indictment were affirmed.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bellacosa stated that:
Every individual surely has a right to refuse to cooperate with
the police on a street inquiry based purely on suspicion or hunch.
However, to then leap to the proposition that flight can be given
no legal significance whatsoever in an encounter based on an

3.
4.

fifty milligrams or more of phencyclidine; or
one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of
an aggregate weight of one-quarter ounce or more containing

concentrated cannabis as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision
five of section thirty-three hundred two of the public health law.
5. five hundred milligrams or more of cocaine.
Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree is a
class D felony.

Id.
9. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1057, 619 N.E.2d at 397, 601 N.Y.S.2d at
460.
10. Id. at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
1l. Id.
12. Id.
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objective and credible reason is a major misdirection in these
ever-proliferating cases. 13

These two views expressed by the New York Court of Appeals
are diametrically opposed to each other. As this Note will show,
the majority and minority opinions expressed in this case reflect
the dichotomy existing between a majority of New York State
courts and the United States Supreme Court respectively.
In order to effectively analyze this issue, the history of search
and seizure jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court
must first be examined. Once this foundation is presented, a
better understanding of the New York Judiciary's handling of this
issue may be achieved. Since the *FourthAmendment is so broad
in its scope, this Note will focus on the "fleeing exception" to an
illegal seizure. 14 However, in order to accomplish this task, we
must begin with the question: What is a seizure?
The federal analysis will commence with the Fourth
Amendment cases stemming from Terry v. Ohio15 and terminate
with the most recent case to discuss evidence obtained from a
fleeing suspect, California v. Hodari D. 16 As this Note will
demonstrate, the United States Supreme Court has drastically
narrowed the Fourth Amendment protections afforded criminal
defendants in cases following Terry. 17 Furthermore, a discussion
18
of several tests articulated by the Court over the years will
clarify what is meant by an individual's constitutional right "to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
13. Id. at 1060, 619 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
14. Flight, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that the
suspect may be engaged in criminal activity, could justify pursuit. See Holmes,
81 N.Y.2d at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
15. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("No right is held more sacred, individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." (quoting Union
Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))).
16. 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (holding that officer's seizure of evidence does
not occur until there is a showing of physical force or a showing of authority
which causes the defendant to yield).
17. See infra notes 109-191 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 49, 73, 114, and 189 and accompanying text.
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unreasonable searches and seizures ...."19 Once this foundation

is laid, this Note will focus specifically on New York's position
on the "fleeing exception" to search and seizure as articulated in
Holmes.

I. TERRY v. OHIO AND ITS PROGENY
The Fourth Amendment states in part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures,

shall

not

be

violated ....,,20 Without question, the key to unlocking the
protection afforded by this amendment is the phrase
"unreasonable
searches
and
seizures."
Absent
the
"unreasonableness" factor, searches and seizures may be lawfully
and necessarily performed through the use of legitimate law
enforcement practices. 2 1 However, when the "reasonableness"

barrier is crossed, the Constitution comes into play and another
constitutional dilemma arises.22 A Fourth Amendment question,
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Id.
21. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). The Court found that
"[t]he [Fourth] Amendment's protection is not diluted in those situations where
it has been determined that legitimate law enforcement interests justify a
warrantless search: the search must be limited in scope to that which is
justified by the particular purposes served by the exception." Id.; see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). The cornerstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis has always been "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id.
22. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665-66 (1989) ("[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is
necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.");
United States v. Montoya, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) ("The 'reasonable
suspicion' standard has been applied in a number of contexts and affects a
needed balance between private and public interests when law enforcement
officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause."); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) ("On one side of the balance are
arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal
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therefore, necessitates a choice between the rights of the
23
individual and society as a whole.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated several
standards to be used to determine whether a seizure has occurred
in an encounter between a police officer and a private citizen. 24
However, the Court appears to narrow the standard each time it
decides the issue of whether a police officer has seized an
individual within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 25
Moreover, this standard is tightened further by the Court when
26
pronouncing the definition of "unreasonableness."
A. What Constitutes a Justifiable Seizure?
In Terry v. Ohio,27 the Supreme Court decided the issue of
whether an unreasonable seizure occurs when a police officer
confronts an individual on the street and subjects that person to a
search, when less than probable cause exists. 28 In Terry, a police
officer noticed two men standing on a street comer acting
suspicious. 2 9 The officer suspected that the two men were

"casing a job, a stick up," and after a third man joined in the

same behavior, the officer decided to approach them. 3 0 After
with breaches of public order."); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703
(1983) ("We must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.").
23. See infra note 52.

24. For the "Show of Authority Test", see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); for the "Reasonableness Test", see United States v. Mendenhall, 466
U.S. 544 (1980); for the "Intent and Physical Control Test", see California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991); Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct 2382 (1991);
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
25. See infra notes 109-191 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. Id. at 15. The Court stated that "a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest." Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 6-7.
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identifying himself as a police officer, he asked for both their
names and identification. 3 1 When Terry, the petitioner,
..mumbled something" in response to one of the officer's
questions, the officer grabbed and frisked him, finding a gun on
Terry's person. 32 In deciding whether suppression of the
evidence was warranted, the Court held that
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot . . . he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search ... in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
33
used to assault him.
The definition of a seizure derived from Terry is that a person
is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
"whenever a police officer accosts [him] and restrains his
freedom to walk away . . . . "34 The Court noted, however, that
they were not deciding
the constitutional propriety of an investigative "seizure" upon
less than probable cause for purposes of "detention" and/or
interrogation. Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude
that a 'seizure' has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty
took
upon this record whether any such "seizure"
place

.

. . prior to

[the] Officer['s] ...

initiation of physical

contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, and we
thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon
35
constitutionally protected rights had occurred.
Thus, a seizure has been effectuated when an officer, by actual
force or a display of authority, has restrained an individual's
31. Id. at7.
32. Id. The officer then ordered all three men into a nearby store and
patted down the other two, at which time another gun was found. id.
33. Id. at 30. However, the Court ultimately held that the seizure had been
reasonable, even though unsupported by facts showing probable cause. id.
34. Id. at 16.

35. Id. at 19 n.16.
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liberty. 3 6 While the spectrum of Fourth Amendment issues
encompasses many aspects of an individual's personal liberty, the
definition articulated in Terry deals with cases in which the police
officer does not arrest the individual, but only demands that the
37
person stop.

It is clear that street encounters between private citizens and
police officers are diverse in their scope. 3 8 "They range from
wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful
information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving
arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. " 3 9 Thus, the Court has held
that "inoffensive contact" between a citizen and a police officer
cannot be analyzed as a seizure of the person. 40 However, the

Court has not yet gone so far as to clarify exactly what
constitutes inoffensive contact. 4 1 In other words, there has yet to

36. Id. at 16.
37. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits
Under the Fourthand FourteenthAmendments, 35 ST. Louws U. L.J. 205, 271
(1991). Although the Court in Terry recognized the need for police officers to
stop individuals, it held that such stops must be subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny because the "inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to
the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his
study." Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.).
38. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. The Court found that "[s]treet encounters
between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity." Id.
39. Id. The Court also noted that "hostile confrontations are not all of a
piece. Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a
different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the
conversation." Id. The Court further stated that "[e]ncounters are initiated by
the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated
to a desire to prosecute for crime." Id.
40. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980). The
Court held that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
where Drug Enforcement Agents "observ[ed] the respondent's conduct, which
appeared to the agents to be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying
narcotics," approached her and took her for questioning, upon which the
agents found heroin on her person. Id. at 547-49. The Court noted that when a
person's freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force or a
show of authority, a seizure has occurred. Id. at 553.
41. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. The Court found that "[i]n the
absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a
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be articulated a "bright line" test in order to determine when the
42
reasonable bounds of the Constitution are broken.
In order to effectuate a working rule, the Court in Terry
created a "sliding-scale" test. 4 3 The test calls for a distinction

"between a 'stop' and an 'arrest' (or a 'seizure' of a person), and
between a 'frisk' and a 'search. ' 44 The Court stated that in
order to justify either, "the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e]
intrusion." 45 For example, a situation in which a patrolman
witnesses what he reasonably suspects to be a drug transaction
surely "warrants intrusion. '"46 As such, any evidence proffered
47
from such an intrusion should be admissible in court.

Moreover, the Court in Terry stated that an objective standard is
used to determine the constitutionality of a police officer's

actions. Thus, the question to be asked is: "[W]ould the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure

. .

. 'warrant

member of ihe public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a
seizure of that person." Id.
42. See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) ("Given the
diversity of encounters between police officers and citizens ...

the Court has

been cautious in defining the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment on
encounters between the police and citizens.").
43. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10. The Court recognized that "in dealing with the
rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in
need of an escalating set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the
amount of information they possess." Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 21. The Court further stated:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with
enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Id.
46. See id.

47. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). ("[O]ur
evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence
seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be
admissible in the prosecution's case in chief.").
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a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken
was appropriate?" 48 Accordingly, the Terry Court set forth a
dual test to determine whether a search and seizure is reasonable.
It stated that one must determine: (1) whether the police officer's
action was justified at its undertaking, and (2) whether the search
and seizure were "related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.-"49
The above reference to a drug transaction will suffice to
explain this test. Clearly, police intervention in drug activity
which an officer witnesses is reasonable and demands
intervention. 50 This would satisfy the first prong of the test.
However, the second prong might not automatically be satisfied
based on the limited facts given. Suppose the officer merely saw
a group of youths standing on the street corner in a high-crime
neighborhood. If the officer approaches the youths and demands
a search, this is clearly an unreasonable seizure and not within
the scope of the circumstances which prompted the interference
in the first place. However, Terry allows an officer to approach
the youths and ask them questions in the hope that voluntary
answers might give the officer at least reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity might be afoot. 5 1
B. Show of Authority
While an individual who has been physically restrained by an
officer cannot reasonably believe he is free to leave, such is not
48. Teny, 392 U.S. at 21-22. The Court noted that "[a]nything less would
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently
refused to sanction." Id. at 22.

49. Id. at 19-20.
50. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983) (permitting the
police to make investigative stops at airports increases the likelihood that the
police will prevent the flow of drugs).
51. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 22. However, the Terry Court was not as
concerned with the police officer's questioning of the suspects, but, "whether
there was justification for [the police officer's] invasion of Terry's personal
security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation." Id.
at 23.
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always the case when a law officer effectuates a seizure by a
means which does not include a physical touching. Therefore, a
brief discussion is warranted at this point concerning a law
enforcement official's "show of authority." '52 For a "show of
authority" seizure to exist, the officer effectuates a mental
detention, instead of physically restraining the individual. 53 The
officer's conduct thereby causes the individual to believe that he
is not free to leave. 54 However, the officer's conduct must be
specifically designed to produce a stop and the individual must in
fact stop. 55 Anything further on the part of the police officer may
constitute an unreasonable seizure. 56
With the above in mind, it is necessary to discuss the
differences between a stop and an encounter. Questions posed by
an officer to an individual that are casual in nature and not
"psychologically coercive" are considered encounters. 57 In order
for interaction between a police officer and a suspect to constitute
an encounter, a police officer need not have any reasonable
suspicion to approach the individual. 5 8 On the other hand, a stop
occurs when an officer uses a show of authority which puts a
mental restraint on an individual. 5 9 While an arrest requires
probable cause, the Court has consistently held that a stop
52. See id. at 19 n. 16. "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer,

by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."; see
also Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991); California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
53. See supra note 52.

54. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ("We
conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to

leave."); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search For A
Definition Of A Seizure: What Is a "Seizure" Of A Person Within The Meaning
Of The Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 619, 623 (1990).
55. See Clancy, supra note 54, at 624.

56. See Clancy supra note 54, at 623.
57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
58. Id.
59. See Urbonya, supra note 37, at 272.
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requires less justification that an arrest, 60 as well as a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity exists. 61 Moreover, the Court has
pronounced that a stop and frisk is merely a minor inconvenience
which is a legitimate means of accomplishing proper law
enforcement when reasonable suspicion is present. 62
C. The Reasonableness Test
In United States v. Mendenhall,63 the petitioner sought to
suppress evidence obtained on "the ground that it had been
acquired from her through an unconstitutional search and seizure
by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration.. .. "64 In
that case, federal drug agents spotted the defendant in an airport
who matched the profile of a drug courier. 65 The agents
identified themselves and asked her to produce identification and
her plane ticket. 6 6 When the names on the ticket and driver's
license did not match, the agents became suspicious and asked
60. Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 10-11. ("[A] 'stop' and a 'frisk' amount to a mere 'minor
inconvenience and petty indignity,' which can properly be imposed upon the
citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police
officer's suspicion.").
63. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
64. Id. at 547.

65. Id. The Court noted that
[t]he agent testified that the respondent's behavior fit the so-called
"'drug courier profile"- an informally compiled abstract of
characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs. In this
case the agents thought it relevant that (1) the respondent was arriving
on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the agents to be the
place of origin for much of the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) the
respondent was the last person to leave the plane, "appeared to be very
nervous," and "completely scanned the whole area where [the agents]
were standing"; (3) after leaving the plane the respondent proceeded
past the baggage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the
respondent changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Id. at 548 n. 1.
66. Id. at 548. The Respondent produced her driver's license, which was
in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall, and her airline ticket, which was issued in
the name of "Annette Ford." Id.
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67
her to accompany them to an office for further questioning.
Once in the office, the agents apprised defendant of her right to
refuse a further search, and then asked her if they could inspect
her "person and handbag." 68 The subsequent search of defendant
revealed that she had heroin on her person, for which she was
69
subsequently arrested.
Based on these facts, the defendant argued that she had been
unlawfully seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when the federal drug agents approached her without reasonable
suspicion. 70 Thus, she asserted that the heroin found on her
person should be excluded at trial. 7 1 Finding this argument
insufficient, the Court held that

a person is "seized" only when, by means of physical force or a
show of authority, h[er] freedom of movement is restrained.
Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation
whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards ....

As long as

the person to whom the questions are put remains free to
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under
the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification. 72
Under this holding, the Mendenhall Court articulated a new test
to determine when a seizure has occurred. The Court concluded
that a person has been seized within the meaning
Amendment only if, in view of all of the
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
believed that [s]he was not free to leave.

of the Fourth
circumstances
would have
Examples of

circumstances that might indicate a seizure ...

would be the

threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the

67. Id.
68. Id. To this, she responded, "Go ahead", and handed the Agent her

purse. Id.
69. Id. at 549.
70. Id. at 549-50.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 553-54.
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citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
73
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.
Thus, we can see that the Court has shifted the focus from what
the officer feels is a suspicious situation 74 to how the individual
being seized perceives the situation. 7 5 While the literal definition
of seizure articulated in Terry7 6 was still applied, the Court
examined the totality of the circumstances from the point of view
of the person being seized instead of from the officer. 7 7 In short,
the focus was on how a reasonable suspect would interpret the
78
officer's conduct.
The Court followed the reasonable person test in Immigration
and NaturalizationServ. v. Delgado,7 9 which held that a person

is not seized under the Fourth Amendment

"[u]nless

the

circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was

not free to leave. .

. . "80

In this case, Immigration and

Naturalization Service agents entered a factory in order to
73. Id. at 554; see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207
(1979); Teny, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
74. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. ("[Tlhere must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime.").
75. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
76. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 30. ("W]here a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot ....[he] identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries... he is entitled... to conduct a carefully
limited search. ... ").
77. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. "The question whether the Respondent's
consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined from the totality of
the circumstances. . . ." Id. at 557 (citing Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
78. Id. at 554.
79. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). The Court found that "interrogation relating to
one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself,
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." Id. at 216.
80. Id.
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question employees as to their legal status in this country.81
During the questioning, employees of the factory were allowed to
move about the premises and continue working, but were not
permitted to leave the building. 82 The Court justified its holding
by determining that the employees were not seized under the
Fourth Amendment. 83 Furthermore, the court stated that
the mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought
to leave the building should not have resulted in any reasonable
apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or
detained in any meaningful way. Since most workers could have
had no reasonable fear that they would be detained upon
leaving, we conclude that the work forces as a whole were not
seized. 84
Within the purview of the reasonable person test is a balance
between "the public's interest in effective law enforcement as
well as each person's constitutionally secured right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures." 85 It has been a major
concern of the Court that the "individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy" is not destroyed by arbitrary invasions at the
discretion of a police officer. 86 In short, the reasonableness of a
seizure should depend "'on a balance between the public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers.' "87
The Court made it clear in Mendenhall that a person has "not
[been] seized simply by reason of the fact that ... [officers]
approached [him or] her. . . and posed to [him or] her a few

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 219.
Id.

85. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 565 (Powell, J., concurring).
86. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("A central concern in
balancing these competing considerations in a variety of settings has been to
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to

arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.").
87. Pennsylvania v. Minmms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (quoting United

States v. Brigoni-Sponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
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questions." 88 Thereafter, an individual who voluntarily complies
with an officer's reasonable questions is not unreasonably seized
in the eyes of the Court. 89 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Powell stated that the reasonableness of a stop depends upon
whether the circumstances of each case warrant such a stop. 90 In
particular, Justice Powell stressed "(i) the public interest served
by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii)
the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied
in light of his knowledge and expertise."91
The inconsistency of the reasonableness test, however, is
apparent in the cases following Mendenhall. In Florida v.
Royer,92 officers approached Royer in an airport believing that
his "appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the socalled 'drug courier profile.' ' 93 After asking Royer for
identification, 94 the officers then requested that he accompany
them to a room for questioning, and confiscated his baggage
"[w]ithout ... consent or agreement." 95 Royer unlocked the
suitcase, and without seeking further acquiescence, an officer
opened it, and found marijuana. 96 Arguing that the officers did
not have probable cause to seize him, Royer moved to suppress
the drugs obtained from the search. 97 The Court held that since
"Royer was being illegally detained when he consented to the
search of his luggage ... the consent was tainted by the illegality
and was ineffective to justify the search." 9 8 Moreover, the Court
stated that
[t]he predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable
cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion
88. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555.
89. Id. at 555-56.
90. Id. at 561 (Powell, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 507-08.
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on the personal security of the suspect. The scope of the
intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular
facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is
clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer's suspicion in a short period of time. 99
The Court preceded to state that it was "not suggest[ing] that
there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual
encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop." 100 Nevertheless,
the Court, agreeing with the Florida Court of Appeals, found that
Royer's "confinement was tantamount to arrest." 101
Interestingly, what the Court was saying in Royer resembled
what Justice Douglas articulated in his dissenting opinion in
Terry. 102 Justice Douglas stated that a search and seizure will not
be constitutionally accepted under Fourth Amendment standards
"unless there was 'probable cause' to believe that (1) a crime had
been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being
committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed." 103 The
burden, therefore, is on the state to prove that a seizure it wishes
to justify is limited in scope to satisfy the reasonableness
element. 104 Thus, the scope of the seizure becomes the focal
99. Id. at 500.
100. Id. at 506.
101. Id. at 496. The factors which the Court examined were that
Royer had 'found himself in a small enclosed area being confronted by
two police officers -- a situation which presents an almost classic
definition of imprisonment.' [citation omitted] The detectives' statement
to Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics also bolstered
the finding that Royer was 'in custody' at the time the consent to search
was given. [citation omitted] In addition, the detectives' possession of
Royer's airline ticket and their retrieval and possession of his luggage
made it clear ... that Royer was not free to leave.
Id.
102. Terry, 392 U.S. at 35-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
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point which varies from situation to situation, especially when the

105
facts surrounding the cases are similar.
In short, "[the reasonable person] test is necessarily imprecise,
because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police
conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular
details of that conduct in isolation." 106 Thus, the Court has found
that the blatant inconsistencies inherent in the reasonable person
test are its major flaw. 107 Furthermore, the Court has failed to
set forth a single standard to follow the general rule of the Fourth
Amendment: That "a seizure must be based on specific, objective

facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the
seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be

carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers."

10 8

II. THE SUPREME COURT'S NARROWING VIEW OF A
SEIZURE
A. Intent And Physical Control
The latest United States Supreme Court decisions to define a
Fourth Amendment seizure are Brower v. County of Inyo,1 09
Floridav. Bostick, 110 and Californiav. HodariD. 111
105. Id. ("The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent
with the particular facts and circumstances of each case.").
106. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988). The Court
followed the traditional approach familiar in Terry and Mendenhall. Id.
Moreover, it stated that "what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a
person to conclude that he is not free to 'leave' will vary, not only with the
particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct
occurs." Id.
107. Id. at 573-74.
108. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
109. 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (finding that the conduct of the police, by
maintaining a roadblock on the highway which caused the death of fleeing
suspect during high speed chase, constituted Fourth Amendment 'seizure').
110. 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991) (holding that seizure of narcotics from a
suspect in a bus terminal was outside Fourth Amendment protection).
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In Brower, the decedent's estate brought a § 1983112 action
alleging that the county used brutal and excessive force in
establishing a road-block, thereby effectuating an unreasonable
seizure of decedent. 113 The Court found that Fourth Amendment
seizures do not occur merely because the government caused a
termination of an individual's freedom of movement, rather, a
seizure occurs "only when there is a governmental termination of
114
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied."
Thus, the Court held that "the complaint... sufficiently
allege[d] that [authorities], under color of law, sought to stop
Brower by means of a roadblock and succeeded in doing so. That
is enough to constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." 115 The Court further noted that a mere
show of authority would not be sufficient to constitute a seizure
of the person and it must be accompanied by actions "designed to

produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does
111. 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (finding that narcotics thrown from fleeing
suspect where no probable cause existed did not constitute tainted evidence).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
113. Brower, 489 U.S. at 594. Petitioners alleged that
under color of statutes ... respondents (1) caused an 18-wheel tractortrailer to be placed across both lanes of a two-lane highway in the path
of [the decedent's] flight, (2) 'effectively concealed' this roadblock by
placing it behind a curve and leaving it unilluminated, and (3) positioned
a police car, with its headlights on, between [the decedent's] on-coming
vehicle and the truck, so that [the decedent] would be "blinded" on his
approach.
Id. Consequently, the decedent was involved in a fatal collision with the truck.
Id.
114. Id. at 596-97.
115. Id. at 599.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/5

18

Pilewski: People v. Holmes

1994]

PEOPLEv. HOLMES

not occur." 116 A seizure, according to the Brower Court, occurs
"even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the
detention or taking, but the detention or taking itself must be
willful." 117 The intent element in this context is gauged by an
objective standard, focusing on the means used, not the officer's
1 18
subjective beliefs as to how they intended to stop the person.
Notwithstanding the above, a seizure, according to the Brower
analysis, does not occur when the individual reasonably believes
that he is not free to leave, but rather, when actual physical
control is manifested. 119
In the next case, Floridav. Bostick, 120 Justice O'Connor stated
that
the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach
individuals at random in airport lobbies and other public places
to ask them questions and to request consent to search their
luggage, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he
or she could refuse to cooperate. This case requires us to
determine whether the same rule applies to police encounters that
12 1
take place on a bus.
Bostick arose as a result of the adoption by the Broward
County Sheriffs Department of a program which permitted law
enforcement officers to routinely approach individuals, either
randomly or because they were suspected, "in some vague way"
of engaging in criminal activity, and to ask them inherently
incriminating questions."122 In Bostick, two officers with the
Broward County Sheriffs Department boarded a bus on which
Terrance Bostick was a ticketed passenger. 123 Although the
116. Id. at 598.
117. Id. at 596; see also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971)

(holding that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and
when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest
of the second party is valid).

118. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 3; see also Urbonya, supra note 37, at 280.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Brower, 489 U.S. at 596; see also Clancy, supra note 54, at 645.
111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
Id. at 2384.
Id.
Id.
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officers were dressed in civilian clothing, they did display
"badges, [a jacket with an official department] insignia and one

of them [held] a recognizable zipper pouch, containing a
pistol." 124 Without "articulable suspicion," both officers walked
to the back of the bus where Bostick was sitting. 125 The officers
then proceeded to explain their presence on the bus to the
passengers, stating that they were narcotics agents on the lookout
for illegal drugs. 126 Pursuant to that goal, they asked the
defendant for permission to search his luggage. 127 After no
illegal contraband was found in the first bag, the officers
searched Bostick's suitcase, which was stored in an overhead
compartment. 128 The record indicated that there was a question
as to whether the officers received consent from Bostick to search
his luggage and whether the officers apprised him of his right to
refuse the search. 129 Regardless, the search of Bostick's suitcase
produced cocaine, for which he was arrested and later charged
with drug trafficking. 130 Bostick moved to suppress the "cocaine
on the grounds that it had been seized in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights."' 13 1 The trial court denied Bostick's
motion. 132 The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2384-85.
126. Id. at 2385.
127. Id. Prior to explaining their presence, the police officers asked Bostick
for identification and for his ticket. Id. Inspection revealed that the name on
the ticket matched Bostick's identification. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The Florida Supreme Court held the practice of "working the
buses" to be unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, the court found the defendant
Bostick to have been seized by the officers. Id. In coming to its conclusion, the
court stated:
During questioning, the Officer ...stood in a position that partially
blocked the only possible exit from the bus. At the time, Bostick
testified that the Officer ...had his hand in a black pouch that
appeared to contain a gun. Because Bostick was en route to Atlanta, he
could not leave the bus, which was soon to depart. He had only the
confines of the bus itself in which to move about, had he felt the officers
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whether a police encounter on a bus amounts to a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, where the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure. 133
In holding that random bus searches are not per se
unconstitutional, 134 the Court stated that
a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer
approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a
reasonable person would feel free "to disregard the police and go
about his business" . . . the encounter is consensual and no
reasonable suspicion is required. The encounter will not trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual
nature. 135
Based on the facts of this case, the Court found that
the mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus [did]
not mean that the police seized him. Bostick was a passenger on
a bus that was scheduled to depart. He would not have felt free
to leave the bus even if the police had not been present. Bostick's
movements were "confined" in a sense, but this was the natural
result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing about
whether or not the police conduct at issue was coercive. 136
In spite of the Court's analysis, it "refrain[ed] from deciding
whether or 'not a seizure occurred in this case." 137 The Court
concluded its analysis by
would let him do so. Under such circumstances a reasonable traveler
would not have felt that he was 'free to leave' or that he was 'free to
disregard the questions and walk away'.

Bostick v. Florida, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
133. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
134. Id. at 2389 ("The Florida Supreme Court erred'in adopting a per se
rule.").

135. Id. at 2386 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628
(1991)). The Court further stated that "obviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).
136. Id. at 2387.
137. Id. at 2388.
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adher[ing] to the rule that, in order to determine whether a
particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider
all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine
whether the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the
officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. That rule
applies to encounters that take place on a city street or in an
airport lobby, and it applies equally to encounters on a bus. 138
In the last case, California v. Hodari D., 139 the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with the issue surrounding the
admissibility of evidence discarded by a fleeing suspect during
the course of police pursuit. 140 In Hodari, a police officer
approached a group of youths congregating near a car in a highcrime part of the city. 14 1 Upon seeing the unmarked police car
and the plain-clothed officers, the youths ran. 142 While the first
officer, Officer Pertoso, chased after Hodari, the second, Officer
McGolgin, followed in the car behind them. 143 While in hot
pursuit, Pertoso had almost grabbed the suspect when Hodari
"tossed away what appeared to be a small rock." 144 "A moment
later, Pertoso tackled Hodari; handcuffed him, and radioed for
146
assistance." 145 The rock turned out to be crack cocaine.
Subsequently, Hodari moved to suppress the evidence claiming

138. Id. at 2389. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Florida
Supreme Court to determine whether Bostick reasonably believed that he was
not free to decline the officers' request to search his luggage or terminate the
encounter with the police. See id. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion
characterized the Broward County Sheriffs practice of "working the buses" as
a tactic that "bears all the indicia of coercion and unjustified intrusion
associated with the general warrant," and therefore dishonored the "core
values" of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
140. Id. at 623-24.
141. Id. at 622.
142. Id. at 622-23.
143. Id. at 623.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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that it was the result of an illegal seizure. 147 The "issue
presented [wvas] whether, at the time he dropped the drugs,
Hodari had been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 14 8
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that an illegal
seizure was not effectuated by Officer Pertoso when he chased
Hodari. 14 9 In defining a seizure, Justice Scalia relied on a
dictionary definition, stating that: "For most purposes at common
law, the word connoted not merely grasping, or applying
physical force to the animate or inanimate object in question, but
actually bringing it within physical control." 150 Moreover, a
seizure was likened to a common law arrest. 15 1 "To constitute an
arrest ... the quintessential 'seizure of the person' under our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence... the mere grasping or
application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or
not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was sufficient."152
Thus, in Hodari, the Court discarded the prior definitions of a
seizure, which included a "show of authority",153 and held that
nothing short of physical control or voluntary submission would
54
amount to a seizure. 1

147. Id. Hodari argued that a seizure takes place "when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen." Id. at 625 (quoting Teny, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16). Thus, he
asserted, the officer's pursuit qualified as a "show of authority" constituting a
seizure. Id. at 625-26.
148. Id. at 623.
149. Id. at 626.
150. Id. at 624 (citing to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2057 (1981)).
151. Id. at 626.
152. Id. at 624. But, since the officer did not apply any physical force to
Hodari during the period prior to his abandonment of the cocaine, there was no
seizure. Id. at 625.
153. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
154. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 627.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 5

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

Notwithstanding the above, the Hodari Court appears to
backtrack and utilize the pre-Terry conception of a seizure. 155
Prior to Terry,
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures
of persons was analyzed in terms of arrest, probable cause for
arrest, and warrants based on such probable cause. The basic
principles were relatively simple and straightforward: The term
"arrest" was synonymous with those seizures governed by the
Fourth Amendment. 156
In Hodari, Justice Scalia added to this by finding that where there
is no arrest by physical force, voluntary submission to the
"assertion of authority" will suffice. 157 In any event, Hodari
effectively ruled out merely a "show of authority" as a means of
158
effectuating a seizure.
While the act of fleeing itself does not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be at hand, 159 the
Hodari Court did not entertain this contention. 160 The Court had
previously found that "deliberately furtive actions and flight at
the approach of. ..law officers" are strong indications that a
crime has been committed, "and when coupled with specific
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the
evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the
decision to make an arrest." ' 161 However, in Hodari, there was
no such specific knowledge on the part of Officer Pertoso that
155. Id. at 627 n.3 ("Terry unquestionably involved conduct that would
constitute a common-law seizure; its novelty (if any) was in expanding the

acceptable justification for such a seizure, beyond probable cause.").
156. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979).
157. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 627.
158. Id. The Court found that a seizure "does not remotely apply... to the

prospect of a policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing
form that continues to flee. That is no seizure." Id. at 626-27.
159. See id. at 624 n.l. The Court relied on the State of California's
concessions "[t]hat it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young
men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not selfevident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense." Id.
160. Id. at 624.
161. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968).
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related any crime committed by Hodari. 162 According to the
dissent, the fact that Hodari was in a neighborhood known for its
high crime, standing alone, was an insufficient basis for
concluding that Hodari was committing a crime himself. 163
Conversely, there have been arguments made that the totality of
the circumstances warrants conduct similar in nature to that of
Officer Pertoso. 164 Nevertheless, realizing full well that the need

to capture a fleeing suspect is directly related to the severity of
the crime, the dissent argued that the act of fleeing does not, in
and of itself, necessitate pursuit. 165 Moreover, recalling the test
articulated in Mendenhall for identifying when a seizure is
effectuated, 16 6 the Hodari Court effectively emasculated the

Mendenhall test as a basis for determining conclusively whether
or not a seizure has occurred. 167 Moreover, the Court found that
Hodari's dependence on the line of cases utilizing this test was
misplaced.

16 8

Respondent's reliance himself upon the Mendenhall test was
clearly erroneous, in that he failed to follow the letter of the law.
The test states that "a person has been seized 'only if', not that
he has been seized 'whenever'; it states a necessary, but not a
162. Hodari,499 U.S. at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 563-64 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
165. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 630, n.4. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "It has long
been a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do
sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as
the guilty parties, or from and unwillingness to appear as witnesses.
Id.(Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. ("[A] person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave."); see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 567, 573 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983).
167. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 628-29; see also Randolph Alexander Piedrahita,
A Conservative Court Says "Good-bye To All That and Forges a New Order
in the Law of Seizure - California v. Hodari D., 52 LA. L. REv. 1321, 133233 (1992).
168. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 628.
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sufficient condition for seizure--or more precisely, for seizure
effected through a show of authority." 16 9 Specifically,
Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a "show of
authority" is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived

that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether
the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a
reasonable person. 170
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that "the
constitutionality of a police officer's show of force should be
measured by the conditions that exist at the time of the officer's
action." 17 1 Thus, the mere fact that Officer Pertoso did not touch
Hodari before the crack was thrown does not "dissipate the taint"
of the evidence. 172 Justice Stevens concluded by stating that the
majority's ruling was simply "creative lawmaking." 173
In deciding the issue presented in Hodari, the Court had a duty
to strike a "balance between the public interest and appellant's
right to personal security and privacy." 174 Therefore, in the
absence of probable cause or "any basis for suspecting appellant
of misconduct," this balance must tilt in favor of the individual's
"freedom from police intervention."' 175 However, the Hodari
Court appeared to minimize the level of police intrusion based on
the facts presented in this case. The Court noted that

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 645 (Stevens J., dissenting). "A search must be justified on the

basis of the facts available at the time it is initiated. . . ." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
172. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). The
Court stated:
[T]he exclusionary rule... prohibits the introduction of derivative
evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the
primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of
the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the

unlawful search becomes 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'
Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
173. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
175. Id.
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[s]treet pursuits always place the public at some risk, and
compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be
encouraged. Only a few of those orders, we must presume, will
be without adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready
means of identifying the deficient ones it almost invariably is the
responsible course to comply. Unlawful orders will not be
deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule
those of them that are not obeyed. Since policemen do not
command "Stop!" expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping
to be outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their
176
genuine, successful seizures.
Although the facts in Hodari were new to the Court's definition
of a seizure, this is not the first time that the Court discussed a
police officer's limitations during hot pursuit. 177 The Court has
previously held that a police officer may not seize every person
17 8
whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries.
Thus, before an officer "places a hand on the person of a
citizen... he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable
grounds for doing so." 179 It has been argued that by "narrowing
the definition of the term seizure, instead of enlarging the scope
of reasonable justifications for seizures, the Court has
significantly limited the protection provided to the ordinary
citizen by the Fourth Amendment." 180 Moreover, based on the
majority opinion, the "free to leave" aspect of the reasonable
person test 18 1 appears to no longer exist. According to the
Hodari Court, a seizure occurs only when an officer physically
grabs an individual. 182
Although the majority stated otherwise, Officer Pertoso's act of
chasing the suspect certainly relayed the message to Hodari that

176. Hodari,499 U.S. at 627.

177. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (holding that the
placement of a police roadblock which suspect subsequently crashed into
constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure).
178. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
179. Id.

180. Hodari,499 U.S. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
182. Hodari,499 U.S. at 627-28.
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he was not free to leave. 183 However, had Officer Pertoso
successfully grabbed Hodari before the crack was discarded, a
seizure would have taken place. 184 Therefore, if the narcotics
had been found on Hodari's person as a result of an unlawful
seizure, they would be deemed inadmissible, due to the obvious
violation of Hodari's Fourth Amendment rights. 185 According to
the majority's analysis, had Officer Pertoso grabbed Hodari, but
Hodari managed to escape and then threw the crack away, the
evidence would not have been disclosed during an arrest. 186
Adherence to this line of reasoning, therefore, leads to the
conclusion that if Officer Pertoso had fired his gun at Hodari, but
missed, this would not have amounted to a seizure. 187 That, of
188
course, would be untrue.
In essence, the Court has said that an officer may approach an
individual where no basis exists for suspecting that person of
anything. 189 Nevertheless, the intent behind the intrusion must be
examined. 190

It is well established that the Court does not have the power "to
suspend Constitutional guarantees so that the Government may
more effectively wage a 'war on drugs."'

191

In this author's

opinion, the "war on drugs" has, in effect, mandated that law
enforcement officials utilize whatever means available to curtail
the lucrative drug trade in America. From the holding in Hodari,
albeit a drastic one, the Supreme Court has given law
enforcement officials the means by which to wage their war in
that a seizure now "requires either physical force ...

or, where

183. Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 630-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 625.

186. Id.
187. Id. at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting)..
189. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386.
Fourth Amendment
190. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 ("[A]
seizure ... occur[s] whenever ... there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.").
191. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389 ("If that war is to be fought, this Court is
not empowered to forbid law enforcement practices simply because it considers
them distasteful").
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that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority." 192 As
will be shown in the forthcoming discussion, New York has not
yet joined the Supreme Court in this effort.
In short, the decision in Hodarihas gone too far in formulating
the definition of when a seizure of the person occurs. Instead, a
happy medium must be formulated where valid law enforcement
can be achieved, so that the criminal element existing in today's
society can be obliterated.
B. Hodari'sImpact On The Exclusionary Rule
It is well established that evidence obtained by virtue of an
unreasonable search and seizure is rendered inadmissible by the
Fourth Amendment. 193 Although the ruling in Hodari did not
change this "exclusionary rule," it did, as previously discussed,
limit the rule's use.194 The Court reasoned that it was Hodari's
independent act of throwing the crack which accomplished the
disclosure.195 Relying on a 1924 case, Hester v. United
States, 196 the majority related the act of relinquishing evidence
during a pursuit as a legitimate seizure. 197 In Hester, Justice
Holmes stated that the "defendant's own acts... disclosed the
[jug of illegal moonshine] ... and there was no seizure in the
sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of [the
jug] after it had been abandoned." 198 Accordingly, in Hodari,
the court found no reason why the crack cocaine which defendant
threw away while being chased by the officer was the result of a
forced abandonment. 199
192. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626.
193. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) ("[A]II evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is... inadmissible in a
state court.")
194. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625.
195. Id. at 629.
196. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
197. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 629. "The cocaine abandoned while he was
running was in this case not the fruit of a seizure, and [defendant's] motion to
exclude evidence of it was properly denied." Id.
198. Hester, 265 U.S. at 58.
199. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 627.
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The rule set forth in Terry more than adequately sets the
standard for invoking the exclusionary rule. 200 In Terry, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule may not be summoned when
evidence is obtained by legitimate police procedures; anything
less than that, however, warrants the rule's use. 20 1 As Justice
Stevens points out in his dissent in Hodari, "[a seizure] must be
justified on the basis of the facts available at the time it is
initiated; the subsequent discovery of evidence does not
retroactively validate an unconstitutional [seizure]. "202
In short, if the Fourth Amendment is going to be invoked, the
Court must first determine whether the officer had sufficient
justification for his actions, and if the facts do not suggest such
action, the evidence adduced from it may not be admitted against
the suspect. 20 3 If, on the other hand, there is justification for his
actions, the officer's seizure of the individual will produce valid
evidence. 204 However, by its holding in Hodari, the Court has
significantly broadened the range of circumstances which may
render evidence obtained through seizure admissible. 205
Consequently, it has been argued that the Court has effectively
lessened the rights of individual citizens by allowing the type of
evidence specifically protected by the Fourth Amendment to be
20 6
used against them in a court of law.

200. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-14. The Court stated that the exclusionary rule
"cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police
investigative techniques on the ground that much conduct which is closely
similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections." Id. at
13.
201. Id.
202. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 645. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See, e.g., Bostick, 111 S.Ct. at 2387. The Court has consistently held
"that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level
of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." Id.
204. See supra notes 182-188 and accompanying text.
205. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626-27.
206. Id. at 629 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The Court's narrow construction
of the word 'seizure' represents a significant . . . unfortunate, departure from
prior case law construing the Fourth Amendment." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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II. PEOPLE v. HOLMES VERSUS CALIFORNIA v.
HODARI D.
New York follows the United States Supreme Court in holding
that the Fourth Amendment protects against random, unlawful
interference with private individuals. 20 7 However, although in
many respects the New York Constitution mirrors the United
States Constitution, 20 8 it differs in its application of the facts in a
given case. 209 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that states
are free to develop their own law of search and seizure in order
to meet their individual needs. 2 10 Nevertheless, a state "may
not... authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth
Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to
such conduct." 2 11 It has been further recognized that the
language of Article I, section 12, of the New York State
Constitution 2 12 and the Fourth Amendment 2 13 "not only contain
similar language but share a common history." 2 14 With this
background in mind, it will be shown that New York's
207. People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112, 324 N.E.2d 872, 876-77, 365
N.Y.S.2d 509, 515 -16 (1975).
208. See People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053,
568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (1991) ("[The language of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and section 12 of article I of the New York State
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is
identical. .. ").
209. Id. at 437-38, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704 ("[A] State
court may adopt a different construction of a similar State provision
unconstrained by a contrary Supreme Court interpretation of the Federal
counterpart.").
210. See generally Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968). "New
York is, of course, free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet
the needs of local law enforcement, and in the process it may call the standards
it employs by any names it may chose." Id. (citation omitted).
211. Id. at 61.
212. N.Y. CONST. art I, §12 ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ..
").
213. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
214. People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 570 N.E.2d 1.051, 1053, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (1991).
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interpretation of the definition of a seizure is at odds with that of
the United States Supreme Court.
When dealing with the issue of street encounters, the New
York Court of Appeals has stated that such
encounters between the patrolman and the average citizen bring
into play the most subtle aspects of our constitutional guarantees.
While the police should be accorded great latitude in dealing with
those situations with which they are confronted it should not be
at the expense of our most cherished and fundamental rights. To
tolerate an abuse of the power to seize or arrest would be to
abandon the law -- abiding citizen to the police officer's whim or
caprice -- and this we must not do. Whenever a street encounter
2 15
amounts to a seizure it must pass constitutional muster.
Recalling the facts of People v. Holmes, 2 16 the forthcoming
section will discuss the treatment that New York courts have
given to the question of what constitutes a seizure during a street
encounter between the police and private citizens. In Holmes, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant's act of
flight, in and of itself, was insufficient to provide the reasonable
2 17
suspicion necessary to permit seizure of an individual.
However, one can quickly see that this same behavior on the part
215. People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365

N.Y.S.2d 509, 516 (1975) (finding an unreasonable seizure where police
officers blocked parked car and approached defendant on sidewalk when police

observed defendant smoking what the officer believed to be marijuana); see
also People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 19, 409 N.E.2d 958, 960, 431

N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (1980). In Chestnut, the court stated that
[s]treet encounters between private citizens and law enforcement

officers are inherently troublesome. This is so because two competing,
yet equally compelling, considerations inevitably clash, to wit: the
indisputable right of persons to be free from arbitrary interference by
law enforcement officers and the nondelegable duty placed squarely on

the shoulders ot law enforcement officers to make the streets reasonably
safe for us all. While in an ideal society the two might never clash, a
quick glance through our newspapers reveals that our society is far from
perfect. Thus, the judiciary is put to the task of balancing these

competing considerations, so that they can reasonably coexist.
Id.
216. 81 N.Y.2d 1056, 619 N.E.2d 396, 601 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1993).

217. Id. at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 461.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/5

32

Pilewski: People v. Holmes

1994]

PEOPLEv. HOLMES

759

of Hodari gave the police in that case sufficient reason to
chase. 2 18 Based on Holmes, it becomes readily apparent that New
York will not stretch the authority of police officers beyond the
requisite "founded suspicion predicated on specific articulable
facts that criminal activity is afoot." 2 19 In fact, the Holmes court
reaffirmed this proposition by stating that "[p]olice pursuit of an
individual 'significantly impede[s]' the person's freedom of
movement and thus must be justified by reasonable suspicion that
a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed.- 220 The
court continued that "[f]light alone... or even in conjunction
with equivocal circumstances that might justify a police request
for information is insufficient to justify pursuit because an
individual has a right 'to be let alone' and refuse to respond to
police inquiry. "221
A. The De Bour Test
The Holmes court relied on several recent New York Court of
Appeals cases when formulating its holding. However, in order
to appreciate the decision in Holmes, it is necessary to understand
the standard by which the validity of a seizure is judged in New
York.
The seminal case in New York search and seizure law is
People v. De Bour.2 22 That case involved the stopping and
questioning by two police officers of Louis De Bour, who was
merely walking toward the officers along a city street early one
morning. 22 3 When De Bour was approximately forty feet from
the officers, he crossed the street. 224 The officers followed and
218. See Hodari., 499 U.S. at 626.
219. People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 352 N.E.2d 562, 566, 386
N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1976).
220. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1057-58, 619 N.E.2d at 397, 601 N.Y.S.2d at

460.
221. Id. at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 461; see also People
v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 727-28, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115, 693 N.Y.S.2d 760,
762 (1992).
222. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375.
223. Id. at 213, 352 N.E.2d at 565, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
224. Id.
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upon reaching De Bour, one of them asked him what he was
doing in the neighborhood. 225 That same officer then noticed a
bulge in the suspect's jacket. 2 26 After asking De Bour to undo his
coat, the officers noticed a revolver tucked in the waist of his
pants. 227 De Bour was subsequently arrested and charged with
possession of a weapon. 22 8
In claiming that the officers acted unlawfully, De Bour argued
that "the obvious show of authority and the equally obvious
display of force by virtue of his being outnumbered by armed
officers" deprived De Bour of his freedom of movement. 229 The
prosecution "contend[ed] that De Bour's crossing the street to
avoid the officers in an area where there was a high incidence of
narcotics crimes triggered a duty to ascertain whether there was
any criminal activity afoot." 230 While defining "a seizure of the
person for constitutional purposes to be a significant interruption
with an individual's liberty of movement," 2 31 the court found no
such infringement in this case. 232 Thus, in holding that this

action did not constitute an unlawful seizure, the New York
Court of Appeals stated that "a policeman's right to request
information while discharging his law enforcement duties will
hinge on the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity
of the crime involved, and the circumstances attending to the
encounter. "233
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 213-14, 352 N.E.2d at 565, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
229. Id. at 215, 352 N.E.2d at 566, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 379. De Bour relied
on People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509
(1975). In Cantor, the court of appeals held that
[w]henever an individual is physically or constructively detained by

virtue of a significant interruption of his liberty of movement as a result
of police action, that individual has been seized within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. This is true whether a person submits to the
authority of the badge or whether he succumbs to force.
Id. at 111, 324 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (citation omitted).
230. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 215, 352 N.E.2d at 566, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
231. Id. at 216, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
232. Id. at 217, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
233. Id. at 219, 352 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
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Regardless of the fact that the De Bour court found no
constitutional violation, it noted the importance of an individual's
freedom to walk the streets. 234 Specifically, the court stated that
[t]he basic purpose of the constitutional protections against
unlawful searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and
security of each and every person against all arbitrary intrusions
by government. Therefore, any time an intrusion on the security
and privacy of the individual is undertaken with intent to harass
or is based upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, the spirit
of the Constitution has been violated .... 235
In enforcing this constitutionally protected right to be left
alone, the New York Court of Appeals in De Bour articulated a
four-part test to determine the validity of a seizure. First, the
court stated that "[t]he minimal intrusion of approaching to

request information is permissible when there is some objective
credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of

criminality." 2 36 The next level of police intrusion is the common
law right to inquire. 2 3 7 The third level, similar to the Terry stop
and frisk, is valid "[w]here a police officer entertains a
reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is

committing

or

is

about

to

commit

a

felony

or

misdemeanor.. .. "238 "Finally, a police officer may arrest and
234. Id. at 217, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
235. Id. at 217, 352 N.E.2d at 567-68, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
236. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
237. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
238. Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1992).
This section provides that:
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an
arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a
public place located within the geographical area of such officer's
employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is
committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a
felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his
conduct.
2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security
services for any court of the unified court system may stop a
person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he
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take into custody a person when he has probable cause to believe
that person has committed a crime, or offense in his
presence. "

3.

239

reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed
or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor
defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his conduct.
When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in
subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the
case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical
injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any
instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious
physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places
by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument,
or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes
may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep
it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall
either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.

Id.
239. Id.; see also N.Y. CrIM. PROC. § 140.10 (McKinney 1992). Section
140.10 states that:
1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, a police officer may
arrest a person for:
(a) Any offense when he has reasonable cause to believe that
such person has committed such offense in his presence; and
(b) A crime when he has reasonable cause to believe that such
person has committed such crime, whether in his presence or
otherwise.
2. A police officer may arrest a person for a petty offense, pursuant
to subdivision one, only when:
(a) Such offense was committed or believed by him to have been
committed within the geographical area of such police
officer's employment; and
(b) Such arrest is made in the county in which such offense was
committed or believed to have been committed or in an
adjoining county; except that the police officer may follow
such person in continuous close pursuit, commencing either
in the county in which the offense was or is believed to have
been committed or in an adjoining county, in and through
any county of the state, and may arrest him in any county in
which he apprehends him.
3. A police officer may arrest a person for a crime, pursuant to
subdivision one, whether or not such crime was committed within
the geographical area of such police officer's employment, and he

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/5

36

Pilewski: People v. Holmes

1994]

PEOPLEv. HOLMES

763

Since not all encounters between police officers and private
citizens rise to the level of that which is protected by the
Constitution, 240 the New York Court of Appeals has determined
that the request for information from a citizen during a street
encounter is a "minimal intrusion," which will pass constitutional
scrutiny. 24 1 Based on this, a police officer may approach an
individual on the street and ask questions. At this point of the
inquiry, with other facts or circumstances which could rise to the
level of reasonable suspicion lacking, the citizen may walk away
with no further police intrusion. As the court of appeals stated:
An individual to whom a police officer addresses a question has a
constitutional right not to respond. He may remain silent or walk
may make such arrest within the state, regardless of the situs of
the commission of the crime. In addition, he may, if necessary,
pursue such person outside the state and may arrest him in any
state the laws of which contain provisions equivalent to those of
section 140.55.
Id. . See People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 195, 590 N.E.2d 204, 212,
240
581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 627 (1992) ("[E]ncounters that fall short of Fourth
Amendment seizures still implicate the privacy interests of all citizens and that
the spirit underlying those words required the adoption of a State common-law
method to protect the individual from arbitrary or intimidating police
conduct."); People v. John B.B., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 487, 438 N.E.2d 864, 866,
453 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (1982) ("[N]ot every encounter of an inquisitorial
nature rises to the level of a seizure within the meaning of the constitutional
language.... ."); De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 216, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 380 ("[N]ot every encounter constitutes a seizure."); People v.
Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 516
(1975)..The Cantorcourt stated that
[s]treet encounters between the patrolman and the average citizen bring
into play the most subtle aspects of our constitutional guarantees. While
the police should be accorded great latitude in dealing with those
situations with which they are confronted it should not be at the expense
of our most cherished and fundamental rights. To tolerate an abuse of
the power to seize or arrest would be to abandon the law-abiding citizen
to the police officer's whim or caprice -- and this we must not do.
Whenever a street encounter amounts to a seizure it must pass
constitutional muster.
Id.
241. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
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or run away. His refusal to answer is not a crime. Though the
police officer may endeavor to complete the interrogation, he
may not pursue, absent probable cause to believe that the
individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime, seize or search the individual or his possessions, even
though he ran away. 242
The second level of the De Bour model gives the police a
"common-law right to inquire." 243 This prong differs from the
first level, the right to request information, in that here an officer
must have a founded suspicion that criminal activity is at
hand. 244 This does not require probable cause. However,
[o]nce the police officer's questions become extended and
accusatory and the officer's inquiry focuses on the possible
criminality of the person approached, this is not a simple request
for information. Where the person approached from the content
of the officer's questions might reasonably believe that he or she
is suspected of some wrongdoing, the officer is no longer merely
asking for information. The encounter has become a commonlaw inquiry that must be supported by [a] founded suspicion that
245
criminality is afoot.
Thus, a police officer, witnessing the exchange of envelopes in a
high-crime area, may be presented with adequate suspicion,
though not probable cause, to pursue and even chase an
individual with the outcome being a valid seizure. 24 6 While
242. People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 586, 408 N.E.2d 908, 910, 430
N.Y.S.2d 578, 581, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
243. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
244. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
245. People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 191, 590 N.E.2d 204, 210, 581
N.Y.S.2d 619, 625 (1992). The court, in reaffirming the De Bour model,
continued by stating that
[n]o matter how calm the tone of [police] officers may be, or how polite
their phrasing, a request to search [an individual on the street] is
intrusive and intimidating and would cause reasonable people to believe
that they were suspected of criminal conduct. These factors take the
encounter past a simple request for information.
Id. at 191-92, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
246. See People v. Matienzo, 81 N.Y.2d 778, 780, 609 N.E.2d 138, 139,
593 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (1993) (passing of small plastic bag in exchange for
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flight, by itself, is not sufficient to give a police officer
reasonable suspicion to seize an individual, 2 4 7 flight coupled with
some indicia of criminal activity is sufficient to procure a lawful
seizure. 2 4 8 If the person approached "might reasonably believe
money was sufficient to give officer founded suspicion that crime was being
committed); People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734, 736, 497 N.E.2d 687, 688, 506
N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (1986) ("The fact that defendant passed what appeared to
be a 'three dollar bag' in a neighborhood known for its drug activity
constitutes, at the least, the 'objective credible reason' necessary to support the
intrusion attendant to a police approach of a citizen.").
247. See Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at
461 ("Flight alone... or even in conjunction with equivocal circumstances
that might justify a police iequest for information is insufficient to justify
pursuit because an individual has a right 'to be let alone' and refuse to respond
to police inquiry.") (citations omitted); People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444,
448, 606 N.E.2d 951, 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1992) ("Defendant had a
right to refuse to respond to a police inquiry and his flight when the officers
approached could not, in and of itself, create a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity."); People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 592, 408 N.E.2d 908,
914, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 585, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980)
("[W]here... there is nothing to establish that a crime has been or is being
committed, flight, like refusal to answer, is an insufficient basis for seizure or
for the limited detention that is involved in pursuit."). But see People v. Jones,
69 N.Y.2d 853, 854-55, 507 N.E.2d 299, 300-01, 514 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707-08
(1987). In Jones, the police, thinking that defendant was the victim of a crime,
witnessed defendant running away from them with a skirt in his hands. Id.
"[T]he police pursued [defendant] and when they caught him they asked why
he had run away when they called and asked about the recovered skirt." Id. at
854, 507 N.E.2d at 300-01, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 708. The court of appeals found
that defendant's flight alone constituted a reasonable suspicion to question
defendant, for which he was arrested and convicted of robbery. Id. at 855, 507
N.E.2d at 301, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
248. See Howard, 50 N.Y.2d at 592, 408 N.E.2d at 914, 430 N.Y.S.2d at
585; see also Matienzo, 81 N.Y.2d at 780, 609 N.E.2d at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d
at 786 (passing of small plastic bag in exchange for money together with
defendant's flight was sufficient to give officer reasonable suspicion that crime
was being committed); Leung, 68 N.Y.2d at 736, 497 N.E.2d at 688, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 321.. In Leung, the court stated:
The fact that defendant passed what appeared to be a 'three dollar bag'
in a neighborhood known for its drug activity constitutes, at the least,
the 'objective credible reason' necessary to support the intrusion
attendant to a police approach of a citizen. When coupled with
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that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing, the officer is no
longer merely asking information," 249 and reasonable suspicion
is then needed in order to permit lawful continuance of the
encroachment.
The third level, New York's equivalent of the Terry stop and
frisk, gives a police officer the power to forcibly stop and detain
an individual when there is reasonable suspicion that a crime is
either being committed, has been committed, or is about to be
committed. 250 Without reasonable suspicion, a police officer may
not detain an individual, and any evidence acquired by the officer
will be excluded from inadmissible at trial. 25 1
Finally, at the fourth level, an officer may arrest an individual
when there exists probable cause to do so. 2 5 2
defendant's

immediate

flight ... [it]

establishes

the

necessary

reasonable suspicion ....
Id.
249. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 191, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
250. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385;
see also People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365
N.Y.S.2d 509, 516 (1975).
251. See People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 354-55, 538 N.E.2d 76, 78,
540 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (1989). The Wesley court stated that
[t]he exclusionary rule has as an objective the social benefit of deterring
unlawful police conduct. Given that the basis of the rule is a social
policy judgment, it is not surprising that there has been no consensus
concerning the contours of the rule. The decision as to who is, or should
be, entitled to enforce the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures necessarily entails balancing the cost of the loss of probative
evidence against the gain in deterring lawless police conduct. Courts in
other States have chosen to weigh these factors differently, but in this
State, as in the Federal courts, it has long been held that the policy best
serving these competing interests is one that -- recognizing the rights
protected by the Fourth Amendment as personal rights -- limits
invocation of the exclusionary remedy to persons whose own protection
has been infringed by the search and seizure.
Id.; see also People v. Drain, 73 N.Y.2d 107, 110, 535 N.E.2d 630, 631, 538
N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1989) ("This court has long recognized, therefore, that
the application and scope of the exclusionary rule is ascertained by balancing
the foreseeable deterrent effect against the adverse impact of suppression upon
the truth-finding process.").
252. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
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In short, "[t]he four-tiered method for analyzing police
encounters gives officers acting in their law enforcement capacity
leeway in approaching individuals for information. It does not,
however, permit police officers to ask intrusive, potentially
incriminating questions unless they have founded suspicion that
criminality is afoot."253
Thus, the crucial factor in determining whether a seizure is
lawful requires a balancing of the interests involved in the police
inquiry. The factors to take into account are "(1) the nature and
scope or severity of the interference with individual liberty, (2)
the public interest served, and (3) the objective facts upon which
the enforcement officer relied, in light of his knowledge and
experience."254 The court of appeals has recently stated that
[t]he continued vitality of De Bour... is not contingent upon the
interpretation that the Supreme Court gives the Fourth
Amendment, because De Bour is largely based upon
considerations of reasonableness and sound State policy. We still
believe that police encounters that are not seizures or arrests for
constitutional purposes should be evaluated under the De Bour
test. The interests in privacy and security that led us to adopt255that
test as a matter of State common law are no less vital today.
Based on the foregoing and the fact that the De Bour four-part
test is still valid law in New York,25 6 it is readily apparent how
greatly the New York courts differ in this area from the United
States Supreme Court.
B. The Reasoning in Holmes
The Holmes court relied on more recent case law in arriving at
the conclusion that Mr. Holmes was unlawfully seized within the
meaning of both the State and Federal Constitutions.

253. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 192, 590 N.E.2d at 210, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
254. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d at 589, 408 N.E.2d at 912, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 583.

255. Hoilman, 79 N.Y.2d at 195-96, 590 N.E.2d at 212, 581 N.Y.S.2d at
627.

256. See id. at 185, 590 N.E.2d at 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
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In People v. Martinez,257 the defendant was observed by police
258
officers removing a "Hide-a-Key" box from a store window.
Cognizant of the fact that the area was known for its high crime
and drug activity, the plain clothes officers approached the
defendant. 259 Upon seeing the police officers, the defendant ran
into a neighboring grocery store. 260 Once inside, the officers
witnessed the defendant hand the "Hide-a-Key" to the codefendant. 261 Subsequently, the officers "retrieved the box and
found it contained 17 vials of what later proved to be crack
cocaine. " 2 6 2
The court, relying on settled precedent, held that "the police
may pursue a fleeing defendant if they have a reasonable
suspicion that defendant has committed or is about to commit a
crime." 263 Moreover, the reasonable suspicion necessary to give

rise to pursuit "represents that 'quantum of knowledge sufficient
to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the
circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand.' "264 Thus,
in the case of a fleeing suspect, "flight may be considered in
conjunction with other attendant circumstances, namely, the time,
location, and the fact that defendant was seen removing an
instrument known to the police to be used in concealing

257. 80 N.Y.2d 444, 606 N.E.2d 951, 591 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1992).
258. Id. at 446, 606 N.E.2d at 951, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
259. Id. at 446, 606 N.E.2d at 951-52, 591 N.Y.S.2d 823-24.
260. Id. at 446, 606 N.E.2d at 952, 591 N.Y.S.2d 824.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.; see also People v. Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734, 736, 497 N.E.2d 687,
688, 506 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (1986) ("When coupled with defendant's

immediate flight upon the officer's approach, the passing of the manila
envelope in this narcotics-prone neighborhood establishes the necessary

reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed, or was about to commit a
crime, such that pursuit by the officers was justified.").
264. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d at 448, 606 N.E.2d at 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 825
(quoting People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112-13, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365
N.Y.S.2d 509, 516 (1975)).
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drugs." 265 In Holmes, the court found no such attendant
26 6
circumstances which would have justified pursuit.
In People v. May, 267 also relied on by the Holmes court, the
defendant was parked with a companion on a deserted street early
one morning in a high crime area. 268 As two police officers who
were patrolling the area approached the car with their "red turret
.lights and spotlight on, defendant started the engine of the [car]
and slowly pulled away." 2 69 After the defendant complied with
the officer's request that he stop his car, defendant was asked to
produce his driver's license and registration. 270 While the
officers waited for the documents, "they noticed that a towel was
draped over the steering wheel column." 27 1 After calling in the
license plate number of the vehicle, the officers were informed
that the car was stolen, and thus, the defendant was placed under
arrest. 272
The May court held "that when the police, using red turret
lights, a spotlight and a loudspeaker, ordered defendant to pull
the car over, defendant was effectively 'seized'" within the
meaning of the Constitution. "273 Reasoning that the act of slowly
moving the car away from the police did not create the requisite
reasonable suspicion to seize, the court found that the police "had
no legal basis to stop the car when they did."274 Instead, had the
police continued following the car while checking the license

265. Id. at 448, 606 N.E.2d at 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
266. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1058, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at
461.
267. 81 N.Y.2d 725, 609 N.E.2d 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1992).
268. Id. at 727, 609 N.E.2d at 114, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
269. Id.
270. Id. The officers used the police car's loudspeaker to order the car to
pull over. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. The defendant was searched and three vials of crack cocaine were

found in his pocket. Id. Furthermore, the towel was removed, revealing a
broken steering column. Id.
273. Id. at 727, 609 N.E.2d at 114-15, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 761-62.
274. Id. at 728, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
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plate number, a lawful seizure could have been effectuated. 275
Relying on the settled law of this state, the court stated:
The police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question

them... without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
once defendant indicated, by pulling away from the curb, that he
did not wish to speak with the officers, they should not have
forced him to stop without legal grounds to do so. 2 7 6

The court concluded that any deviation from this rule "would
permit police seizures solely if circumstances existed presenting a
277
potential for danger."
In order to determine the reasonableness of a seizure, the court
of appeals has stated that it must "weigh[] the government's
interest in the detection and apprehension of criminals against the
encroachment involved with respect to an individual's right to
privacy and personal security." 27 8 Moreover, when the court
makes such an inquiry, it "must consider whether or not the
action of the police was justified at its inception and whether or
not it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible." 279 To justify this, "the police
officer must indicate specific and articulable facts which, along

275. Id.
276. Id. (citing People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 606 N.E.2d 951, 591
N.Y.S.2d 823 (1992)).
277. Id.
278. People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 111, 324 N.E.2d 872, 876, 365
N.Y.S.2d 509, 514 (1975); see also People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 444-45,
201 N.E.2d 32, 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (1964). The Rivera court stated:
The authority of the police to stop [a] defendant and question him ... is
perfectly clear. The business of the police is to prevent crime if they
can. Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual street action is an
indispensable police power in the orderly government of large urban
communities. It is a prime function of city police to be alert to things
going wrong in the streets; if they were to be denied the right of such
summary inquiry, a normal power and a necessary duty would be closed
off.
Id.
279. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d at 111, 326 N.E.2d at 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
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with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted that intrusion.
280
Vague or unparticularized hunches will not suffice.'
In light of the reasoning in Holmes, it is even more evident that
the standards of the De Bour model have become more stringent
in recent years. While there is little doubt that the New York
Court of Appeals will allow the police to pursue an individual
based solely on that individual's flight, the dissents in Holmes
and May, both written by Judge Bellacosa, represent a more
realistic interpretation of the De Bour test, especially in
consideration of the current criminal problems which plague this
country.

C. The Dissenter
Judge Bellacosa, in his dissent in Holmes, stated that
[s]omething as elemental as running away from a police officer,
after a concededly lawful approach and inquiry, should not be
rendered per se legally meaningless, because the law then is
propelled beyond reasonable comprehension or acceptance. The
new right is then perceived and properly dubbed as a "right to
28 1
run away."

He continued by expressing his frustration with the majority's
opinion that flight, coupled with other suspect circumstances,
may give a police officer reasonable suspicion that a crime has
been committed. 282 The "circumstances that should be
considered with flight occur before, during and after a lawful
police-civilian encounter. All the res gestae of the particular
circumstance should gover." 2 83 However, the majority has
effectively "allow[ed] the facts observed by the police and the
immediate and continuing reactive conduct of defendant to a
280. Id. at 113, 324 N.E.2d at 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
281. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1059, 619 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 462
(Bellacosa, J, dissenting).
282. Id. at 1060, 619 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Bellacosa, J,
dissenting).
283. Id. (Bellacosa, J. , dissenting). Res Gestae is defined as "all the facts
that form the environment of a litigated issue." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1931 (1981).
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lawful approach and inquiry to be automatically thrown out the
courthouse door, neutralizing the confluence of circumstances as
'equivocal.- "284
Relying on People v. Matienzo,2 85 where the court of appeals
stated that "[i]n the circumstances presented, defendant's flight
furnished reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was
about to commit a crime such that pursuit by the officer was
justified," 286 Judge Bellacosa pointed out the major flaw with the
current law in New York; specifically, the inconsistency with the
standard by which reasonable suspicion is gauged. 287 While in
Matienzo, defendant's flight was coupled with the officers
witnessing a "hand to hand" transaction, 2 88 in Holmes, "[o]ne
officer recognized several of the men as having been previously
arrested for drug transactions at the same location," known for
its high drug activity. 289 The activity which the officers in
Holmes witnessed should fall within the "circumstances that
should be considered with flight [which] occur before, during and
after a lawful police-civilian encounter." ' 290 For we must
remember that "[a]ll the res gestae of the particular circumstance
should govern." 29 1 Thus, based on this analysis, the police in
Holmes obtained the requisite reasonable suspicion that a "crime
has been, [was] being, or [was] about to be committed." 292
As a policy consideration, Judge Bellacosa noted that the
majority has "fail[ed] to recognize ...

that rulings like this

contribute to the environment and culture that spreads [the
284. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1060, 616 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 462
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
285. 81 N.Y.2d 778, 609 N.E.2d 138, 593 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1993).

286. Id. at 780, 609 N.E.2d at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
287. See Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1060-61, 609 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d
at 462 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

288. Matienzo, 81 N.Y.2d at 779, 609 N.E.2d at 138, 593 N.Y.S.2d at
785.

289. Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1059, 619 N.E.2d at 398, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 461
(Bellacosa, J, dissenting).

290. Id. at 1060, 619 N.E.2d at 399, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
291. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

292. Id. at 1057-58, 619 N.E.2d at 397, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
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unfortunate] 'reality'" that New York is plagued with high drug
activity. 293 However, "[t]he bottom line is that [Holmes] is a
case about experienced police officers acting in a particular,
known locale with respect to an all-too typical narcotics
transaction circumstance with known actors." 294 For these
reasons, Judge Bellacosa's interpretation of the law of seizure in
New York adequately reflects the harsh reality of our present
crime situation, especially where the crime at hand is the illegal
sale of narcotics.
CONCLUSION

Critics have argued that "[i]f carried to its logical conclusion,
[Hodan] will encourage unlawful displays of force that will
frighten countless innocent citizens into surrendering whatever
privacy rights they may still have." 295 Undoubtedly, the same
argument can be inferred from the minority opinion in Holmes.
However, given the problems that this country is faced with
concerning crime and drug activity, more is needed on the part of
the Judiciary to combat these problems. Perhaps included within
the totality of the circumstances is the fact that law enforcement
officers sometimes recognize certain individuals to be related to
prior drug activity. This, coupled with seemingly suspicious
flight, is often sufficient to give the officer reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity might be looming. According to Judge
Bellacosa, this would not only be a valid seizure, but based on
the law in New York, it is mandated. 296
Given the tests articulated by the Supreme Court for
determining a valid seizure, culminating with Hodari, it is only a
matter of time before the problem of a fleeing suspect becomes so
pervasive that all jurisdictions that now hold as New York, will
follow suit. This author is by no means suggesting that the police
293. Id. at 1061, 619 N.E.2d at 400, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Bellacosa, J,
dissenting).

294. Id.
295. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 646-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. See Holmes, 81 N.Y.2d at 1059-60, 616 N.E.2d at 398-99, 601
N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Bellacosa, J, dissenting).
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have the right to arbitrarily pursue any individual they wish to
pursue and seize that person. Rather, a happy medium can be
struck whereby the experienced police officer will be highly
scrutinized by the courts in order to determine the validity of the
suspicion which prompted the subject pursuit. As previously
stated, "experienced police officers acting in a particular, known
locale with respect to an all-too-typical narcotics transaction
circumstance with known actors"' 297 obtain the requisite
reasonable suspicion when this observance is coupled with the
immediate flight of the actor. 298 However, without this loosening
of the standards in New York, "[o]ne is left to wonder what the
result in th[ese] case[s] would be if, instead of the standard
['stop'] direction, the officers had politely announced, 'Please
don't [run] away. We wish only to conduct a common-law
inquiry and not effect even a partial seizure. "'299
Steven A. Pilewski

297. Id. at 1061, 619 N.E.2d at 400,
dissenting).
298. Id. at 1060, 619 N.E.2d at 399,
dissenting).
299. People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725,
N.Y.S.2d 760, 763 (1992) (Bellacosa, J.,

601 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Bellacosa, J.,
601 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Bellacosa, J.,
729-30, 609 N.E.2d 113, 116, 593
dissenting).
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